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THE UNCERTAIN STEWARDSHIP POTENTIAL OF INDEX
FUNDS
JILL FISCH 
ABSTRACT
Regulators and commentators around the world are increasingly
demanding that institutional investors engage in stewardship with respect to
their portfolio companies. Further, the demand for stewardship has broadened
from an expectation that investors engage to reduce agency costs and promote
economic value to a call for investors to demand that companies serve a broader
range of societal interests and objectives. This chapter considers calls for
stewardship in the context of the U.S. capital markets specifically as applied to
index funds. It argues that, irrespective of the merits of institutional stewardship
generally, the structure of index funds and the business environment in which
they operate limits their ability to engage in effective stewardship. Although
index fund sponsors have had a powerful influence on their portfolio companies,
well-intentioned calls for them to play a more significant role and, in particular,
claims that they should incorporate non-economic objectives more broadly into
their engagement strategy, are in tension with the valuable role that index funds
serve in the U.S. markets by providing a low-cost diversified investment option
for an increasing segment of ordinary citizens. The chapter concludes by
considering the possibility of using pass-through voting to enhance the
stewardship potential of index funds.
INTRODUCTION
Policymakers around the world are demanding that large institutional
investors act as responsible stewards of their portfolio companies.1 The
principal rationale behind the stewardship movement is that engaged
institutional investors offer the potential to reduce managerial agency costs.2


Jill Fisch is the Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law and CoDirector of the Institute for Law & Economics at the University of Pennsylvania
School of Law.
1
See, e.g., Jennifer G. Hill, ‘Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International
Stewardship Codes’ (2018) 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 497, 506–513 (describing global
attention to stewardship following the UK’s creation of the world’s first
stewardship code).
2
See, e.g., Tim Bowley & Jennifer G. Hill, ‘Collective Activism and Shareholder
Stewardship: The Australian Experience’ (this volume, draft at 1-2) (observing that
UK stewardship code was adopted to address lack of shareholder participation in
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Some commentators have also argued that institutional investors should go
further and address broader societal concerns such as the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders and ESG considerations through their voting power, an
pesrspective that has been formalized in the 2020 version of the U.K
Stewardship Code.3
The challenge for the stewardship movement is that it treats institutional
investors – primary large asset managers – as shareholders rather than
intermediaries. Both the structure and the business model of mutual funds limit
their potential stewardship role in ways that stewardship advocates do not seem
to appreciate fully. Because of this, although the increasingly-concentrated
institutional ownership of public corporations has substantially mitigated the
agency problems identified by Berle and Means,4 institutional intermediaries
cannot replicate the actions and incentives of true blockholders.5 As a result,
commentators’ expectations about the potential value of investor stewardship
may be unrealistic.
As this chapter explains, the asset management industry, which
dominates institutional shareownership in the United States, faces two critical
constraints. First, its business model – and, in particular, the increasing flow of
assets into low-cost passively-managed investment vehicles such as index funds
and ETFs (collectively “index funds”) -- is not consistent with the kind of
analysis necessary to provide substantial firm-specific oversight of corporate
officers and directors of their portfolio companies on a cost-effective basis.
Second, as the scope of the stewardship movement becomes more capacious, it
calls for investors to make operational and governance choices, but the
relationship between asset managers and fund beneficiaries provides a tenuous
basis for making those choices.
Although commentators have called for mutual funds to devote greater
resources to stewardship through more frequent engagement as well as the
corporate governance and based on the view that greater engagement would
operate “as a check on centralised managerial power”).
3
See Financial Reporting Council, The UK Stewardship Code 2020 (2020)
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5aae591d-d9d3-4cf4-814ad14e156a1d87/Stewardship-Code_Final2.pdf, at 8, Principle 1 (advocating
“stewardship that creates longterm value for clients and beneficiaries leading to
sustainable benefits for the economy, the environment and society”).
4
See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (1st ed. Macmillan 1932).
5
See Alex Edmans & Clifford G. Holderness, ‘Blockholders: A Survey of Theory
and Evidence’ (2017) https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820976 (identifying challenges in
defining what level of ownership characterizes a blockholder and presenting data
on large-block ownership in the United States).
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increased use of shareholder proposals and even litigation,6 they have not
reflected on the tension between the costs of that stewardship and the benefits
that today’s mutual funds offer their beneficiaries by providing diversified
investment vehicles at unprecedently low fees.7 Nor do they explain why it
would be cost-effective for those who offer a low-cost financial product that
does not require firm-specific investment analysis to invest resources to develop
operational or governance expertise. Indeed, even with respect to the broadbased governance initiatives in which institutions have been actively engaged,
there are questions about the extent to which the policies they advocate are
consistent with enhancing firm value.
To address the concern that institutional investors may be poorly
positioned to incorporate the economic and non-economic preferences of their
beneficiaries into their stewardship or lack the authority to make those choices
on behalf of those beneficiaries, several recent proposals have called for asset
managers to determine those preferences by consulting with their beneficiaries.8
For asset managers such as mutual funds, where direct consultation may be
impractical, some commentators have called for pass-through voting.9 The
limitations of these proposals highlight the difficulty inherent in developing a
workable stewardship policy for an institutional intermediary, particularly a
policy that incorporates non-economic considerations.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Part I describes U.S. developments in
response to the global stewardship movement and, in particular efforts to
encourage institutional investors to engage with their portfolio companies as
“good corporate stewards.” Part II focuses on the specific case of the index fund,
6

See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, ‘Index Funds and the Future of
Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy’ (2019) __ Colum. L. Rev.
__ (forthcoming); Sean Griffith & Dorothy Lund, ‘Toward a Mission Statement for
Mutual Funds in Shareholder Litigation’ (2019) __ U. Chi. L. Rev. __
(forthcoming).
7
Research demonstrates that “the growth of explicitly indexed funds worldwide
enhances competition in the asset management industry.” Martijn Cremers, Miguel
A. Ferreira, Pedro Matos & Laura Starks ‘Indexing and Active Fund Management:
International Evidence’ (forthcoming 2020) __ J. Fin. Econ __,
https://www.darden.virginia.edu/sites/default/files/inline-files/indexing-world2015-publication.pdf.
8
See EU High-Level Group on Sustainable Finance, Financing a Sustainable
European Economy (2018) https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/180131sustainable-finance-final-report_en.pdf 74 (“Pension funds should consult
beneficiaries on their sustainability preferences and build those into their
investment strategy.”).
9
Caleb N. Griffin, ‘We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund
Giants’ (2019) Md. L. Rev.,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3365222.
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offering a brief explanation of its structure and business model. Part III explains
why this business model is inconsistent with aggressive firm-specific
stewardship – specifically a stewardship model that entails firm-specific
monitoring of operational decisions. Part IV considers the challenge presented
by demands that index funds incorporate ESG and sustainability considerations
into their stewardship efforts. Finally Part V explores the distinctive nature of
index fund beneficiaries -- the individuals who invest in index funds -- and the
implications for proposals to empower those beneficiaries.
A cautionary note is in order. This chapter focuses on the specific role
of index funds and does not consider the extent to which the limitations
identified herein are applicable to other types of institutional investors such as
actively-managed mutual funds, hedge funds, banks, public pension funds and
sovereign wealth funds. Notably, the observations in this chapter are decidedly
U.S.-centric and have more limited applicability to jurisdictions in which other
types of instituitonal investors dominate. The core observation of this chapter,
however, is that institutional context matters. Thus in considering the potential
value of investor stewardship, policymakers would do well to reflect on the
business model and structural details of the institutions that they seek to engage.
I. INVESTOR STEWARDSHIP – THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE
As reflected in the 2010 version of the UK Stewardship Code, investor
stewardship was initially intended to encourage institutional investors to respond
to managerial agency problems – primarily excessive risk-taking and shorttermism.10 In the United States, stewardship reflected the potential ability of the
reconcentration of ownership to address the classic Berle and Means problem of
unchecked managerial power in the U.S. publicly-traded corporation. 11 Berle
and Means wrote at a time when the stock of U.S. public companies was held
primarily by dispersed retail investors who lacked the incentive and expertise to
monitor management and limit agency costs. The rise of the institutional
investor offered the possibility of reducing these agency costs.
Today institutional investors own approximately 70% of the stock of
large U.S. public companies, and these holdings are concentrated in a handful of

10

Financial Reporting Council, UK Stewardship Code 2010, available at:
http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UKStewardship-Code.aspx.
11
See, e.g., Mariana Pargendler, ‘The Corporate Governance Obsession,’ (2016)
42 Iowa J. Corp. L. 359, 370-71 (describing Berke & Means’ identification of
corporate governance problems as based, in part, on “unchecked managerial
power”).
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the largest institutions.12 In the United States, the largest institutional investors
are asset management firms such as BlackRock, Vanguard, StateStreet, Charles
Schwab and Fidelity, each of which manages trillions of dollars in assets.
Collecively BlackRock, Vanguard and StateStreet (commonly known as the
“Big Three”)13 “are together the largest owner in 88 percent of the S&P 500 [and
are] the largest shareholder in 40 percent of listed firms in the U.S.”14
Despite the growing size of their holdings, for many years institutional
investors in the United States were not actively engaged in corporate governance
– they often did not vote their shares, they ignored the governance of their
portfolio companies15 and they did not even seek to collect the damages
available to them through shareholder litigation.16 Over the past thirty years,
however, that situation has changed substantially. Institutional investors have
become increasingly active through a range of public and private engagement
efforts, and corporations have responded to these efforts with governance
structures that provide greater transparency and accountability. 17
Even with the increasing involvement of institutional investors in
corporate governance, the 2008 financial crisis caused a number of

12

Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Stephen Davis, ‘Are Institutional Investors Part of the
Problem or Part of the Solution?,’ (2011)
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/millsteincenter/80235_CED_WEB.pdf, at 4.
13
See, e.g., Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, ‘Hidden
Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration of Corporate
Ownership, and New Financial Risk’ (2017) 19 Bᴜs. & Pᴏʟ. 298, 298, 304
(explaining that BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street dominate the passive fund
industry and terming them the “big three”).
14
Bob Eccles, ‘Concentration In The Asset Management Industry: Implications
For Corporate Engagement’ Forbes (17 April 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobeccles/2019/04/17/concentration-in-the-assetmanagement-industry-implications-for-corporate-engagement/#bf13c44402f5
15
See, e.g., Paul Rose, ‘The Corporate Governance Industry,’ (2007) 32 J. Corp.
L. 887, 897 (“Unless an institutional investor believes that it can conduct
research for less, or that more expensive but discerning research will enable it to
obtain better returns (after subtracting its own research costs), the investor may be
better off outsourcing its corporate governance research.”).
16
James Cox & Randall Thomas, ‘Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional
Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?’ (2002) 80 Wash. U L Q
855.
17
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff, ‘The New Titans of
Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors’ (2020) U. Pa. L. Rev.
(forthcoming) (detailing growth of engagement by institutional investors in
corporate governance).
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commentators to believe that investors were falling short.18 In the UK, this led
the UK Financial Reporting Council to adopt the 2010 UK Stewardship Code,
which is often described as “the world’s first stewardship code”19 The UK
stewardship code, which has subsequently been refined,20 is the model for
stewardship codes around the world.21 Commentators and regulators in many
jurisdictions have embraced the idea that institutional investors have an
obligation to engage in active stewardship of their portfolio companies and have
identified a variety of potential benefits from stewardship.22 In April 2017, the
European Union imposed a requirement, as part of its revised Shareholder Rights
Directive, that institutional investors publicly disclose how they integrate
shareholder engagement into their investment strategies or explain why they do
not do so.23
U.S. regulators have not adopted a formal requirement of investor
stewardship. Certain components of what might be deemed a stewardship
function are implicit, however, in other legal requirements that apply to
institutional investors. For example, both the courts and Congress have
recognized that investment advisers owe fiduciary duties to the mutual funds
they manage.24 In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted rules
requiring mutual funds to develop voting policies and procedures as well as how

18

Arad Reisberg, The UK Stewardship Code: On the Road to Nowhere?’ (2015)
15 J. Corp. L. Stud. 217, 219
19
Lee Roach, ‘The UK Stewardship Code’ (2011) 11 J. Corp. L. Stud. 463.
20
Financial Reporting Council, UK Stewardship Code,
http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UKStewardship-Code-September2012.aspx; FRC, 2020 Stewardship Code, supra.
21
See Simon Wong, ‘Is Institutional Investor Stewardship Still Elusive?’ (2015)
Harv Law School Forum on Corp Gov & Fin. Reg.,
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/09/24/is-institutional-investor-stewardshipstill-elusive-2/ (“Five years after the launch of the landmark UK Stewardship
Code, counterparts can be found on four continents”).
22
See Ernst & Young, ‘Q&A on Stewardship Codes’ (2017)
https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-stewardship-codes-august2017/$FILE/ey-stewardship-codes-august-2017.pdf (describing the proliferation of
stewardship codes around the world and explaining that they “typically offer
guidance to investors on how they should exercise their ownership and governance
responsibilities, and how they should interact with the companies in which they
invest”).
23
Press Release, Eur. Comm., ‘Shareholders' rights directive Q&A’ (13 March,
2017), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_592
24
Howard Schiffman, ‘The Relationship Between the Investment Advisor
and the Mutual Fund: Too Close for Comfort’ (1976) 45 Ford L. Rev. 183, 183-84.
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they voted their proxies at their portfolio companies.25 At the same time, the
SEC adopted rules under the Investment Advisers Act requiring investment
adviser to adopt policies to ensure that the funds' voting power is exercised in
the "best interest" of the fund.26
Recently, a group of leading institutional investors in the United States,
went further, forming the Investor Stewardship Group (ISG), a private group of
institutional investors formed in 2017 for the purpose of establishing “the
Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance”27 According to its website,
the ISG consists of 41 signatories and 24 additional “endorsers.” 28 The group
includes some of the world’s largest asset managers and pension funds such as
BlackRock, CalPERS, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Hermes and UBS.29
The ISG framework, a framwork that that Jennifer Hill calls an “investorled” stewardship code,30 sets out both “common expectations” regarding
corporate governance practices of portfolio companies and “a set of fundamental
stewardship responsibilities for institutional investors” 31 In celebrating the one
year anniversary of its release of the framework, the ISG touted its “remarkable
success.”32 Yet whether the ISG framework will stimulate a meaningful change
in the stewardship function of asset managers in the United States remains to be
seen. Notably, to date, although the signatories include several major asset
managers, the number of signatories is limited. A substantial component of the
framework focuses on the governance of portfolio companies as opposed to the
25

Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No.
25922, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564, 6566-67 (7 Feb. 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239,
249, 270, 274)
26
Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
2106 (31 Jan. 2003), 68 FR 6585 (7 Feb. 2003).
27
Investor Stewardship Group ‘About the Investor Stewardship Group and the
Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance’ https://isgframework.org/
accessed 25 Nov. 2019.
28
Investor Stewardship Group ‘signatories’ https://isgframework.org/signatoriesand-endorsers/ accessed 25 Nov. 2019.
29
Id.
30
Hill, supra note 1 at 510-11.
31
Investor Stewardship Group, ‘About the Investor Stewardship Group and the
Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance’ https://isgframework.org/.
accessed 25 Nov. 2019. The ICG’s stewardship principles can be found here:
https://isgframework.org/stewardship-principles/
32
‘Investor Stewardship Group Achieves Remarkable Success in its First Year’
Businesswire (18 Dec. 2018)
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20181218005480/en/InvestorStewardship-Group-Achieves-Remarkable-Success-Year

108

FISCH CHAPTER

[Vol. 99:ppp

stewardship activities of asset managers. And the governance principles
endorsed by the ISG do not appear to extend significantly beyond existing legal
requirements or minimum standards.33 The stewardship principles are similarly
limited.34 Although the ISG adopted the framework in the wake of criticisms by
commentators that some U.S. instituional investors (and in particular, three of
the ISG signatories – BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street) are devoting
insufficient effort to governance and stewardship,35 the principles are not
binding on either issuers or signatories.36 Indeed, the ISG website explicitly
notes that signatories retain the discretion to “implement the stewardship
principles in a manner they deem appropriate.”37
An additional concern about the ISG framework its failure to define the
objectives of investor stewardship explicitly or to designate the extent to which
institutional investors can or should incorporate objectives other than wealth
maximization into the stewardship function.38 Although a growing number of
investors and policymakers are arguing that investor stewardship includes
attention to non-shareholder stakeholders and social policy goals as well as
economic value, and stewardship codes increasing reference these goals, they
provide little guidance as to how a responsible steward is supposed to strike a
balance between competing economic and non-economic objectives or between
shareholders and other stakeholders.
These issues are highlighted in the case of passive investment vehicles
such as index funds. Although these investment vehicles hold title and exercise

33

For example, Principle 1 states that “Boards are accountable to shareholders”, a
principle that is reflected in existing statutory and common law principles such as
fiduciary duties and the power of shareholder to elect and remove directors.
34
Principle A of the Stewardship Framework, for example, states that
“Institutional investors are accountable to those whose money they invest,” a
principle that is inherent in the legal status of asset managers and other institutional
investors as fiduciaries.
35
See, e.g. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 6, working paper at 11 (identifying the
“the shortcomings of current stewardship decisions” by index funds); Dorothy
Lund ‘The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting’ (2018) 43 Iowa J. Corp. L.
493, 497(“passive funds have failed to act as seriously engaged owners”).
36
In describing the ISG, Hill observes that “The Walker Review’s clear message
was that regulator/quasi-regulator-sanctioned codes have more clout than investorled codes.” Hill, supra note 1 at 510.
37
ISG, About the Investor Stewardship Group, supra note 31.
38
See Bernard S. Sharfman, ‘The First Critique of the “Framework for U.S.
Stewardship and Governance”’ (2017) https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-lawblog/blog/2017/11/first-critique-framework-us-stewardship-and-governance
(arguing that “as stewards, the objective of such management must be wealth
maximization.”).
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voting rights with respect to an increasing percentage of global equity and are
particularly important for their growing ownership of the U.S. equity markets,
their distinctive structure and business model provide practical limitations on
their potential effectiveness as corporate stewards. The risk of imposing
extensive stewardship obligations on index funds is that it may have the
consequence of reducing the viability of index funds as an investment tool for
unsophisticated retail investors, creating demands for managerial decisions that
constrain efficient corporate decision-making, or introducing additional agency
costs. As a result, this chapter suggests caution in effort to expand institutional
investor stewardship obligations.
II. THE BUSINESS MODEL OF INDEX FUNDS
This chapter focuses on a particular segment of the institutional investor
market – index funds. Index funds are a type of mutual fund, an investment
vehicle that consists of a pool of assets managed by an investment adviser
pursuant to an advisory agreement. In the case of an index fund, the advisory
services provided are minimal because the fund’s investment strategy is simply
to track the return of a designated index such as the Dow Jones Industrial
Average or the S&P 500.39 There are thousands of potential indexes, but the
majority of assets are invested in funds that track the most popular indexes.40
Thus, for example, the DIA ETF, which is offered by State Street Asset
management, seeks to provide investment returns that track those of the Dow
Jones Industrial Average, and currently consists of approximately $22 billion in
assets under management.41
Estimates vary as to the precise percentage of equity held by index funds;
one estimate from 2017 indicated that index funds hold approximately 18% of
the global stock market.42 That number continues to grow. Within the mutual
fund industry, funds that passively track an index will, if current trends continue,

39

For a more complete discussion of the structure of index funds, see Fisch, et al.,
supra note 17.
40
For a comprehensive explanation of the creation and structure of indexes and
index funds see Adriana Z. Robertson, ‘Passive in Name Only: Delegated
Management and “Index” Investing’ (2019) 36 Yale J. on Reg. 795.
41
State Street Global Advisors, SPDR® Dow Jones® Industrial Average ETF
Trust, https://us.spdrs.com/en/etf/spdr-dow-jones-industrial-average-etf-trust-DIA
accessed 25 Nov. 2019.
42
Trevor Hunnicutt, ‘Less than 18 percent of global stocks owned by index
investors: BlackRock’ (3 Oct. 2017) Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/usfunds-blackrock-passive/less-than-18-percent-of-global-stocks-owned-by-indexinvestors-blackrock-idUSKCN1C82TE
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top 50% of U.S. stock funds within 2019.43 Moreover, with the growth of passive
investing, the mutual fund industry has experienced substantial concentration
such that most mutual fund assets are invested by the top 3 or 4 mutual fund
companies. In turn, BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street and Fidelity collectively
own as much as 15 or 20% of the large public companies.44
Two aspects of the index fund model are particularly relevant in
evaluating their potential to engage in effective stewardship. The first is that,
because the investment model of index funds is passively to track an index, the
advisers of the fund have no reason to engage in firm-specific research and
analysis to informm their investment decisions. In contrast to active managers,
hedge funds and other stock pickers, index funds do not, indeed they cannot,
trade on the basis of information. Rather than the potential opportunity to beat
some designated benchmark, index funds offer their investors a market rate of
return. Because they are designed to replicate the returns of what is typically a
broad-based index, these funds also offer their investors substantial
diversification.
The second aspect of the index fund model that is relevant to its potential
for effective stewardship is its fee structure. Because they do not rely on costly
firm-specific research, index funds incur lower management costs, and they pass
these reduced costs on to mutual fund investors in the form of very low fees.
Because funds that track the same index will, if properly designed, produce nearidentical returns, a fund sponsor cannot distinguish itself in terms of the skill of
its advisers. Nor can a sponsor charge a premium for adviser quality. The result
is that the fees charged by index funds to investors are very low and substantially
lower than those of actively-managed funds. Indeed, in 2018, Fidelity
introduced four no-fee index funds.45 The combination of low cost and
diversification makes index funds a popular tool for retirement accounts, and a
substantial proportion of the assets under management in index funds are
retirement savings, a subject to which this chapter will return in Part V below.
III. PASSIVE INVESTORS AND FIRM OVERSIGHT

43

Charles Stein, ‘Shift from Active to Passive Approaches Tipping Point in 2019,
[2018] Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-31/shiftfrom-active-to-passive-approaches-tipping-point-in-2019
44
See Fichtner, et al., supra note 13, at 298, 304 (presenting data on size and
holdings of the largest US asset managers and showing that BlackRock, Vanguard,
State Street and Fidelity were the four largest as of June 2016).
45
Eric Rosenbaum, ‘Who won the zero-fee ETF war? It looks like no one’ CNBC
(10 Oct. 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/10/who-won-the-zero-fee-etf-warit-looks-like-no-one.html (reporting that Fidelity “launched four core index mutual
funds at no fee,”).
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As the preceding discussion explains, neither index funds nor the
investment advisers who manage them necessarily acquire any firm-specific
information about their portfolio companies in connection with the decision to
invest in those companies. Unlike the prototypical rational investor which
evaluates the information available in the market in order to make an informed
investment decision, index fund advisers mechanically cause the fund to invest
in the securities necessary to match the return of the designated index. While
the fund buys and sells securities on a regular basis – to meet purchase and
redemption requests, to rebalance as necessary and to adjust to changes in the
underlying index – those transactions are mechanical and non-discretionary.
The irrelevance of information to index fund trading makes index funds
an anomaly with respect to federal securities regulation which creates a
disclosure regime designed to enable investors to make informed trading
decisions. Indeed, the threshold criterion for defining securities disclosure
obligations is the concept of materiality which is defined as information such
that there is a “substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in making an investment decision.”46 From the perspective
of an index fund, the disclosures made by its portfolio companies are arguably
irrelevant, at least with respect to the fund’s investment decisions.
Index fund sponsors would, of course, challenge the claim that they do
not use or benefit from corporate disclosures. They use disclosures to make
informed voting decisions, and, increasingly, they engage with their portfolio
companies in an effort to improve their corporate governance, risk management
and economic success.47 Although commentators disagree as to whether passive
funds exert sufficient effort with respect to these initiatives and whether their
efforts lead to improved firm performance, there is little question that index fund
sponsors and advisers are devoting increasing resources to stewardship. Indeed,
the call for increased stewardship – from both academics and policymakers – is
premised on the expectation that those efforts should be increased.
Some academics question whether those demands are cost effective.48
Specifically, for stewardship to have a meaningful impact on a firm-specific
46

Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
47
Voting levels have increased. Index funds are likely to be at least as effective as
many other types of shareholders such as retail investors and algorithmic traders at
rationally voting their shares. In most cases, the level of firm-specific information
necessary to make an informed voting decision is relatively limited.
48
See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, ‘Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate
Governance’ (2019) 71 Stan. L. Rev. 687, 696 (arguing that index funds should not
vote in corporate elections because it is not cost-effective for them to incur
expenditures to monitor their portfolio companies).
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basis – by reducing managerial agency costs, improving operational decisionmaking or modifying firm structure -- investors require firm-specific
information to identify existing deficiencies and to evaluate, within the context
of the firm’s operations, appropriate changes to address those deficiencies. In
addition to acquiring information, investors must develop the necessary
expertise to evaluate that information such that their challenges are reliable. 49
As Ron Gilson explained: “for investors, distinguishing between shortsighted
and well-disciplined managements—and between farsighted companies and
those for whom the payoff will never materialize—is often impossible.” 50
Firm-specific engagement aimed at disciplining management or
identifying value-enhancing structural or operational changes exists in today’s
markets; indeed, it is precisely the business model of the activist hedge fund.
Hedge funds invest in portfolio companies with the plan of evaluating firmspecific information and proposing structural or operational changes designed
to improve firm performance. Although commentators debate the extent to
which hedge fund activism contributes to sustainable economic value as
opposed to relying on short term strategies that conflict with the interests of
long-term holders,51 hedge funds may be, may be considered high-powered
investor stewards.52
Although one can debate whether hedge fund activism is fairly
categorized as stewardship, at least when stewardship is focused on maximizing
economic value and reducing agency costs, the debate is largely semantic. 53
49

Some actively managed firms are going on the offensive. Schroders published a
report in September 2018 saying passively managed funds lacked the resources for
reliable research on whether companies live up to ESG standards. The report said
these lower-cost funds lack the “specialist knowledge” needed to lobby the boards
of portfolio companies for ESG changes. Schroders, ‘ESG in passive: let the buyer
beware’ [2018] https://www.schroders.com/en/insights/economics/esg-in-passivelet-the-buyer-beware/. “There doesn’t appear to be a cheap way to get real
sustainability,” said Jessica Ground, the global head of stewardship at Schroders.
Id.
50
Ronald Gilson, ‘Legal and Political Challenges to Corporate Purpose’ (2019) 31
J. App. Corp. Fin 1, 9
51
See, e.g., Dionysia Katelouzou, ‘Hedge Fund Activism and Shareholder
Stewardship: Incompatible, Reciprocal or Something in Between?’ (forthcoming)
(citing empirical debate over the effect of hedge fund activism on the long term
value of portfolio companies).
52
See, e.g., id. (evaluating activism by UK hedge funds within stewardship
framework); Jill E. Fisch & Simone Sepe ‘Shareholder Collaboration’
(forthcoming 2020) __ Tex. L. Rev. __ (describing collaborative role of hedge
funds).
53
This chapter considers the question of whether stewardship should ecompass
non-economic or non-shareholder objectives below.
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What makes it feasible for hedge funds to engage in effective stewardship?
Three factors are key. First, hedge funds invest in a limited number of portfolio
companies and take a substantial economic position in each. As a result, a hedge
fund has the potential to receive a substantial benefit from its engagement, both
in absolute terms and as a proportion of the overall value of the fund. For
example, hedge fund Trian Partners invested $3.5 billion of its $12.7 billion fund
in Proctor & Gamble.54 The hedge fund’s lack of diversification also minimizes
the free rider effect – although other shareholders in the target company may
benefit from the activism, they will not benefit to the same degree as the hedge
fund.55 Second, hedge funds can devote substantial resources to gathering the
type of firm-specific information necessary to engage in effective stewardship.56
The standard hedge fund fee structure pays the fund advisers 2% of assets under
management and 20% of profits, making it cost-effective for substantial
activism-based expenditures.57 Third, hedge funds have specialized knowledge.
They hire managers and employees that can offer firm and industry expertise.58
All three of these features are absent from the index fund business model.
Index funds offer broad diversification; the very point of an index fund is to
provide its investors with broad market exposure rather than a selected small
group of stocks. Index funds offer their investors very low fees; in fact, the
market appeal of the index fund is its potential to charge less than activelymanaged funds. Finally, given that index funds do not engage in informationbased investment decisions, they derive limited value from paying to develop
firm or industry expertise. As a result, there is a substantial risk that index funds

54

Berkeley Lovelace, Jr., Billionaire Nelson Peltz: P&G is making my board battle
the “dumbest thing I’ve ever been involved in”’ (6 Oct. 2017) CNBC.com
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/06/billionaire-activist-peltz-my-proxy-fight-withprocter-gamble-will-be-close.html
55
This distinguishes hedge funds from mutual funds. See, e.g., Lund, supra note
48 (identifying the free rider concern as a limit on index fund engagement).
56
See, e.g., Zsolt Katona, Marcus Painter, Panos Patatoukas & Jean Zeng ‘On the
Capital Market Consequences of Alternative Data: Evidence from Outer Space’
(July 30, 2018). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3222741 (describing persistent abovemarket returns that hedge funds can obtain through their purchase and use of costly
satellite data of store parking lots).
57
For example, Trian spent an estimated $25 million in its proxy fight with Proctor
& Gamble. Barrett J. Brunsman ‘P&G expects proxy battle to cost $35 million’ (2
Aug. 2017) Cincinnati Business Courier
https://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/news/2017/08/02/p-g-expects-proxybattle-to-cost-35-million.html
58
See C.N.V. Krishnan et al., ‘The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The
Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise’ (2016) 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296
(providing empirical evidence that successful activists bring expertise to their
engagements).
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will impose what Zohar Goshen and Richard Squire term “principal competence
costs” – “mistakes due to a lack of expertise, information, or talent.” 59
Concededly index funds can, and increasingly do, engage in some level
of stewardship that is cost-effective within their existing business model.60 They
can develop expertise with respect to corporate governance issues that affect a
substantial proportion of companies in their portfolios. They can identify and
evaluate market-wide trends and risks such as climate change and cybersecurity
and can call upon those companies that lag to adopt the best practices of industry
leaders.61
Notably, even this level of engagement may present challenges.62 For
example, although it seems uncontroversial to call for index funds to demand
better governance from their portfolio companies, experts often disagree both on
what constitutes good governance and on the relationship of specific governance
features to firm economic value. Thus, while index funds have championed
director independence, and institutional investor pressure has led issuers to
boards that are almost entirely independent of management, empirical evidence
has failed to establish a connection between board independence and firm
economic value.63 Similarly, index funds were among the investors who,
through the Harvard shareholder rights project, sought to persuade their portfolio
companies to eliminate their staggered boards.64 Yet the empirical evidence on
the impact of staggered boards is mixed, and research suggests that staggered

59

Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, ‘Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate
Law and Governance’ (2017) 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 770.
60
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to address the potential that index funds, or
mutual funds generally, will limit their stewardship out of a desire to further other
business relationships with their portfolio companies such as the opportunity to
manage their 401(k) plans. See, e.g., Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business
Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, 85 J. Fin. Econ. 552, 553 (2007) (noting
the argument that mutual funds that manage corporate pension plans may be more
"acquiescent to existing governance practices").
61
See Fisch, et al., supra note 17 (describing engagement efforts by the large
index fund providers).
62
See Alicia Davis, ‘The Institutional Appetite for “Quack Corporate
Governance”’ (2015) Columbia Business Law Review 11-12 (finding that
institutional investors mistakenly believe high-quality internal governance devices
to be value-enhancing).
63
Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, ‘The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance’ (1999) 54 Bus. Law. 921, 924, 933.
64
Daniel Gallagher and Joseph Grundfest, Did Harvard Violate Federal Securities
Law? The Campaign Against Classified Boards of Directors (Rock Center for
Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 199, Dec. 4,
2014), available at https://bit.ly/2IE1bEu.
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boards can be value-enhancing in some cases.65 It is well known that
institutional investors were a leading force in the shift to making executive pay
structures more performance-based, but stock options, a popular feature of early
performance-based structures, turned out to have create problematic incentives
for executives to take excessive risk.66 Most recently, index funds have been
vocal opponents of dual class stock structures, and the Council of Institutional
Investors has urged exchanges and regulators to ban or limit dual class. 67 Again,
however, the empirical data fails to support the claim that dual class stock
reduces firm value.68
One problem with broad-based governance initiatives is the possibility
that the effect of governance is firm-specific and that, as a result, determining
whether a governance reform will enhance value at a particular company
requires firm-specific knowledge.69 This in turn, increases the cost of effective
stewardship. To the extent that one cannot reliably ascertain the economic
impact of particular governance models or structures, either in general or with
respect to individual firms, it may be rational for index funds to adopt a
diversified market-wide approach to governance.
Assuredly index funds could devote greater resources to stewardship to
address these concerns. Index funds could sponsor shareholder proposals, serve
as lead plaintiffs in shareholder litigation and meet with officers and directors at
a greater percentage of their portfolio companies. Index funds could hire
investment advisers with firm and industry expertise and pay those advisers to
devote more hours to acquiring and evaluating firm-specific information. But
65

Id.; Cremers & Simone Sepe, ‘The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards’
(2016) 68 Stan. L. Rev. 67, 71-72.
66
See, e.g., Zhiyong Dong et al., ‘Do Executive Stock Options Induce Excessive
Risk Taking?’ (2010) 34 J. BANK. & FIN. 2518, 3-16 (discussing whether
executive stock options induce excessive risk taking by managers).
67
See, e.g., Council of Institutional Investors, ‘CII Welcomes S&P Dow Jones’
Decision to Ban New Multi-Class Companies from Key Stock Indexes’ (2017)
https://www.cii.org/spdjmulticlassban (explaining that “The Council of
Institutional Investors (CII) welcomes S&P Dow Jones’ decision to ban new multiclass companies from its key U.S. stock indexes”)
68
See George David Banks & Bernard Sharfman, ‘Standing Up for the Retail
Investor’ (2018), Harv. Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and
Financial Regulation, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/06/10/standing-up-forthe-retail-investor/ (criticizing institutions for advocating the elimination of dual
class stock despite the economic success of companies like Google, Facebook and
Berkshire Hathaway.
69
See, e.g, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff
Solomon, How Corporate Governance is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash’
(2016) 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 649, 697 (providing empirical evidence supporting “the
proposition that corporate governance should be decided on a firm-by-firm basis”).
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these efforts are costly. While index fund providers could potentiallly
distinguish themselves on the basis of their stewardship activities and thereby
justify charging higher fees, it is unclear at present whether investors will be
willing to pay a premium to invest in funds that engage in greater stewardship.
Even if they are, it is unclear whether index funds are the most efficient providers
of firm-specific monitoring.
IV. INDEX FUNDS AND STEWARDSHIP OBJECTIVES
Determining the appropriate objectives of investor stewardship adds an
additional complication. The original UK Stewardship code did not definte
stewardship or its objectives.70 That omission has been remedied, and today, in
both the UK and the EU, most calls for institutional investor stewardship do not
restrict themselves to encouraging investors to seek to enhance the economic
value of their portfolio companies but instead urge a broader focus on nonshareholder stakeholders or the public interest.71 This broader focus is reflected
in the 2020 UK Code, which adopts a definition of “stewardship that creates
longterm value for clients and beneficiaries leading to sustainable benefits for
the economy, the environment and society.”72
This mandate complicates the decision-making framework for funds and
their advisers as well as placing additional demands on fund expertise. How are
funds and their managers to determine which societal values warrant attention?
How are fund decisionmakers to weigh the potentially competing interests of the
customers, suppliers, employees and communities affected by the operations of
their portfolio companies and to balance those interests against shareholder
economic value?73 Although increasing the sustainability of a firm’s operations

70

Reisberg, supra note __.
See Dionysia Katelouzou, ‘Shareholder stewardship: a case of (re)-embedding
the institutional investors and the corporation?’ (“Outside the USA, the currently
prevailing narrative, especially in policy circles, views shareholder engagement as
a desirable corporate governance attribute able not only to improve corporate
governance and performance, but also to ensure long-term stability and social
responsibility”)
72
2020 Stewardship Code at 8, Principle 1. The Code goes on to explain that
“Signatories systematically integrate stewardship and investment, including
material environmental, social and governance issues, and climate change, to fulfil
their responsibilities.” Id. at 15, Principle 7.
73
See Stephen M. Bainbridge ‘In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green’ 50 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1423,
1436 (explaining that this role is analogous to the untenuous competing duties
imposed on a “lawyer for the situation”).
71
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may enhance firm economic value, there are reasons to reasons to question the
consistent alignment of societal objectives with profit maximization.74
Stewardship addressed to a broader range of objectives also exacerbates
the agency problem faced by index funds and their advisers as intermediaries for
investors in the funds. The problem posed is similar to the one debated eighty
years ago between Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd. Dodd argued broadly that
corporate managers had a responsibility to operate their businesses in the
interests of the general public.75 Berle responded, not out of an opposition to
the general idea that corporations should have a public responsibility but to a
broad view of managerial discretion that would leave it unconstrained.76
Investor stewardship raises similar concerns. If advisers use fund engagement
to maximize the fund’s economic value, investors in that fund have metrics to
evaluate whether that engagement is successful and cost-justified. At the
present, however, the metrics for evaluating the social responsibility of a
portfolio company or a socially responsible investment fund are problematic –
as many commentators have observed, sustainability disclosures are limited,
incomplete and largely unreliable.77
Obligating investment managers to incorporate broad-based stewardship
objectives also increases the risk of self-dealing.78 As with corporate
74

See Leo E. Strine, Jr. ‘Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-profit
Corporations Seek Profit’ [2012] 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 135 (“the cost,
simplistic, and single-minded, short-term focus of stockholders on stock price may
result in outcomes that, from a broader societal perspective, are deeply
uncomfortable.”)
75
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., ‘For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45
Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1148 (arguing that corporations that corporations have a
“social service [responsibility] as well as a profit-making function.”).
76
See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, ‘Shareholder Primacy's
Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation,’ (2008) 34 Iowa J.
Corp. L. 99, 129 (explaining that “To make managers trustees for the community
would free them of any meaningful constraint because almost all corporate activity
could be justified in the interests of one group or another.”).
77
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, ‘Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable’ (2019)
107 Geo. L. J. 924, 926 (critically observing that sustainability disclosures are
neither standardized nor audited and that issuers vary substantially in the
information they provide); Jon Sindreu & Sarah Kent, ‘Why It's So Hard to Be an
'Ethical' Investor’ (1 Sept. 2018) Wall St. J. https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-itsso-hard-to-be-an-ethical-investor-1535799601?mod=?mod=itp&mod=djemITP_h
[https://perma.cc/K7EH-EBUG]. (observing that “A Journal analysis of four
leading ESG ratings providers found that they come to completely different
conclusions about what makes a company a “sustainable” investment.”).
78
As Leo Strine observes, although Henry Ford defended his decision not to pay
corporate dividends as improving social welfare, “Ford’s desire to deny [the Dodge
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managers,79 the heads of institutional intermediaries may “use other people’s
money to advance their own view of the good.”80 There is little reason to think
that fund managers have particular expertise in identifying the most appropriate
social goals, and there is a realistic possibility that the goals they advocate may
instead be controversial or unique.81 At the same time, the substantial voting
power exercised by the large mutual fund companies gives leaders like Larry
Fink at BlackRock a “bully pulpit”82 to take public positions that cause some to
acclaim him as a “visionary”83 despite the fact that, if the principles he advocates
sacrifice economic value, it is the customers in BlackRock’s funds who will bear
the cost.
Asset managers also face competing incentives. Advocating social
responsibility may help asset management firms resist regulatory interventions
motived by fears of their growing power. A firm that is publicly associated with
social responsibility may be more attractive to an employer as the administrator
of company 401(k) plans. A mutual fund company may favor social policies at
their portfolio companies that sacrifice returns to attract discretionary
investments by some investors even if other investors prefer decisions motivated
exclusively by economics. A critical component of the trade-off among
investors is that mutual funds manage a substantial quantity of retirement
investments, many of which are owned by unsophisticated employees who are
defaulted into their employer’s choice of 40!(k) investment option and face the
real prospect of having inadequate retirement savings if the economic returns of
their investments are not maximized.
In addition, there are reasons to believe that even well-intentioned and
unconflicted asset managers may be imperfect proxies for the interests of their
beneficiaries. Scholars have identified significant differences between the
Brothers] dividends that could be used to fund their own eponymous car
manufacturing operations might have also contributed to Henry Ford’s highmindedness.” Strine, supra note 74, n. 32
79
As Stephen Bainbridge observes "The real object and purpose of a corporation
for profit is to make a profit and to make dividends for the stockholders, and a
person who holds the stock of a company has a right to have the business of the
company conducted, as far as practicable at least, so that it will make profits and
pay dividends." Steven Bainbridge, A Predecessor to Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
(2019) https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2019/07/apredecssor-to-dodge-v-ford-motor-co.html citing Arbuckle v. Woolson Spice Co.,
1901 WL 708, at *2 (Ohio Cir. Ct. Jan. 12, 1901).
80
Strine, supra note 74.
81
Id.
82
Peter Georgescu, ‘Fink Swims Against the Sharks’ [2019] Forbes,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petergeorgescu/2019/05/30/fink-swims-against-thesharks/#51da2d865dde
83
Id.

2019]

119

voting preferences of retail and institutional investors on a variety of issues from
election of directors and executive compensation to support for shareholder
proposals.84 Particularly worrisome in this regard is the fact that one of the
largest gaps is with respect to sustainability and ESG issues. As one study
reported, environmental and social proposals were supported by 29 percent of
institutional investors but only 16 percent of retail investors. 85
Although retail voting patterns suggest that mutual fund voting currently
favors ESG issues more than the voting of retail investors, 86 some commentators
assert that investors will sacrifice return in favor of principles.87 Recent asset
flows support this, finding increasing investor demand for ESG-conscious index
funds even though the cost of such funds is significantly higher than other index
funds. To the extent that fund beneficiaries are willing to pay for fund
stewardship, the prospect of more effective index fund stewardship increases
dramatically. On the other hand, studies also suggest that retail investors do not
support their asset managers sacrificing returns in favor of social policy
initiatives.88 One possibility is to retain the low costs of an index-based

84

Ning Chiu, ‘How Do Retail Shareholders Vote?’ [2018] Davis Polk, Briefing:
Governance https://www.briefinggovernance.com/2018/10/how-do-retailshareholders-vote/ (finding substantial greater support by institutional investors for
social and environmental proposals than by retail investors); Gretchen Morgenson,
‘Small Investors Support the Boards. But Few of Them Vote.’ [2017[ New York
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/business/small-investors.html
(reporting on an analysis of shareholder voting that found “a striking contrast
between the views of institutional investors and those of individuals”)
85
Main Street Investors Coalition, ‘Proxy Advisor Recommendations Ignore the
Views of Retail Investors’ [2018[ https://mainstreetinvestors.org/proxy-advisorrecommendations-ignore-the-views-of-retail-investors/
86
Some reports nonetheless criticize mutual funds, particularly ESG funds, for
voting records that do not show greater support for ESG proposals. See, e.g.,
Lewis Braham, Sustainability Ratings Tell Half the Story’ [2017] Barron’s,
https://www.barrons.com/articles/sustainability-ratings-tell-half-the-story1507350027/ Unfortunately because most analyzes of fund voting evaluate
proposals by category rather than the substance of the proposal, they risk
presenting a misleading picture of fund voting policies. See, e.g., Fund Votes,
https://www.fundvotes.com/votingtrends/. Thus, for example, Fund Votes’
presentation of voting data on environmental, social and governance proposals
seems to assume that an ESG-oriented fund would properly support 100% of
shareholder proposals on those topics irrespective of their content.
87
See Gilson, supra note __ at 12 (predicting they will)
88
See Main Street Investors Coalition, supra note __. In an analogous survey of
pension fund beneficiaries “86% of CalPERS members and 79% within NYC
Funds indicated their pension fund should be focused on generating returns and
shouldn’t be making investment decisions on the basis of politics even if they
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investment strategy while committing the fund to a more ESG-oriented voting
policy.89 Indeed, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) offers a specialty set
of socially responsible investment voting guidelines. 90 Although such a fund’s
voting approach must be relatively inflexible to limit costs,91 the approach offers
mutual fund customers a cost-effective way of increasing the social orientation
of their investments. Notably, however, it does so by transfering the task of
determining appropriate social policy from asset managers to ISS, a delegation
that has been criticized in other contexts.92
V. THE ROLE OF FUND BENEFICIARIES
One possible solution to the agency problem is empowering mutual fund
beneficiaries to determine or oversee the stewardship objectives of their asset
managers. This could be done at the entity level through shareholder voting on
or approval of fund stewardship policies or at the beneficiary level through the
implementation of pass-through voting. This section questions the efficacy of
either approach.
As early as the 1970s, the SEC expressed concern about the growing
institutionalization of the public equity markets and the effect of that
institutionalization on proxy voting.93 Among its concerns was the fact that
support the idea or cause.” Spectrem Group, ‘Tensions with Pensions: An
Analysis of Public Pension Fund Members’ Knowledge and
Sentiment about How Their Money Is Being Invested’ [2018]
89
Gina Rao has made such a proposal. See Gina Rao, ‘Give mutual fund investors
a voice in shareholder proxy voting’ (2017) MarketWatch,
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/give-mutual-fund-investors-a-voice-inshareholder-proxy-voting-2017-12-12 (advocating an index fund that commits in
its prospectus to follow an ESG voting policy).
90
See Institutional Shareholder Services, ‘United States SRI Proxy Voting
Guidelines 2019 Policy Recommendations’ (2019)
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/specialty/SRI-US-VotingGuidelines.pdf
91
See Andrey Malenko & Nadya Malenko, ‘Proxy Advisory Firms:
The Economics of Selling Information to Voters’ (2019) 5 J. Fin. 2441 (noting the
“one-size fits all” criticism of proxy advisor recommendations).
92
See, e.g., David Larcker & Allan McCall, ‘Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to
Proxy Advisory Firms’ (2015) 58 J.L. & Econ. 173, 203 ("The outsourcing of
voting to proxy advisory firms appears to have the unintended economic
consequence that boards of directors are induced to make choices that decrease
shareholder value.").
93
See Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder
Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance
Generally, (1978) Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14970, 1978 SEC LEXIS
1127, *31 (noting that, “major institutions held, as at the end of 1977, more than
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institutional voting might not reflect the views of those with the true economic
interest in the shares. In 1978, the SEC explicitly considered the desirability of
obtaining these views “by means of a polling or pass-through voting
requirement.”94 At that time, the SEC reported that “substantially all of the
commentators who addressed the issue . . . were opposed to such a requirement”
citing suggestions that the undertaking would be costly and difficult and that
fund shareholders were unlikely to have an interest in or desire to vote on the
issues affecting their portfolio companies.95
Subsequent technological developments have reduced the cost and
difficulty of pass-through voting. Leading to to renewed calls for pass-through
voting.96 For example, Jennifer Taub has argued that pass-through voting would
enable fund beneficiaries to overcome the passivity of fund advisers. 97 Dorothy
Lund argues that pass-through voting would reduce the “incidence of
uninformed voting.”98 Caleb Griffin suggests that mutual funds could use
standing voting instructions to democratize index fund voting either by enabling
fund beneficiaries to complete an issue-based survey that would form the basis
for the beneficiary’s proxy voting guidelines or by stipulating in advance that
their votes should mirror those of a proxy advisor or another institutional
investor.99
These commentators accurately highlight the potential for pass-through
voting to reduce agency costs, and technological advances such as internet
33% of the total stock outstanding in the United States.). Ironically, the number
today is closer to 70%).
94
Id., 1978 SEC LEXIS 1127, *33-34
95
Id.
96
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet
on Modern Securities Regulation’ (1997) 52 Bus. Law. 1195, 1210-13 (observing
that “on the longer-term horizon, there is even the visionary possibility that the
Internet can be used to pass through voting rights in securities held by pension and
mutual funds to the fund's own owners or beneficiaries”); John C. Wilcox,
Electronic Communication and Proxy Voting: The Governance Implications of
Shareholders in Cyberspace’ [1997] Insights 8, 11 (discussing company
communications with investors through new electronic media and wondering
whether "pass-through voting" for investors in pension funds and mutual funds will
develop). Indeed, there has been some development of pass-through voting in
pension plans. James A. Fanto, ‘Investor Education, Securities Disclosure, and the
Creation and Enforcement of Corporate Governance and Firm Norms’ (1998) 48
Cath. U.L. Rev. 15, 35. N. 79 (observing that “pass-through voting has developed
within both defined contribution and defined benefit pension plans”)
97
Jennifer S. Taub ‘Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to
Advocate for Shareholders' Rights’ (2009) 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 843, 888-89
98
Lund, supra note __ at 530.
99
Griffin, supra note __.
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voting make pass-through substantially less difficult to implement than it was in
the 1970s. The fact remains, however, that mutual fund investors are poorly
positioned to direct the proxy voting of their proportionate interest in the fund’s
portfolio companies. Addressing the complex questions necessary to formulate
an effective stewardship policy are even harder.
In understanding this point, it is important to keep the characteristics of
retail mutual fund investors in mind. In 2018, individual investors held 89% of
mutual fund assets. Mutual fund investors differ from other retail investors.
They select their mutual funds, in the best case scenario on the basis of
investment style and cost and, in the worst case, on the basis of less rational
criteria such as the name of the fund. Typically they do not engage in firmspecific research into the portfolio companies held by the mutual funds in which
they invest; indeed, in most cases they are unlikely to know the portfolio
companies in which the mutual fund is invested. Their very purpose, in choosing
a mutual fund, is to delegate investment discretion to the fund manager.
Further, retail investors hold a substantial percentage of their mutual fund
investments in retirement accounts that have distinctive characteristics. In 2018,
94% of mutual fund investors held their funds inside employer-sponsored
retirement plans, IRAs and variable annuities.100 37% of households held
mutual funds exclusively through employer-sponsored retirement plans and, in
many cases assets held outside such plans were the result of 401(k) rollovers.101
The purchase of a mutual fund in a 401(k) is different from a market-based
investment decision. Although plan participants choose the specific funds in
which they invest, that choice is limited by the menu of investment options
selected by the employer. In addition, an increasing number of employers enroll
their employees into their retirement plans automatically.102 The money of those
employees is invested in a default option designated by the employer unless the
employee chooses an alternative. Default options are commonly index funds or
target date funds that include one or more index funds.
In addition, employee-investors are distinctive. Recent empirical
research suggests that people who invest exclusively through 401(k) plans have
very low levels of financial literacy – lower in fact than other investors. 103 One
100

ICI Fact Book 2019 at 136. 142
Id. at 142.
102
See, e.g., Bob Pisani, ‘America’s retirement accounts are growing, but not fast
enough’ (2018) CNBC https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/12/americas-retirementaccounts-are-growing-but-not-fast-enough.html (reporting that “At year-end 2018,
48% of Vanguard plans had adopted automatic enrollment and 66% of new plan
entrants were signed up that way.”).
103
See Jill Fisch, Annamaria Lusardi & Andrea Hasler ‘Defined Contribution
Plans and the Challenge of Financial Illiteracy (forthcoming 2019) Cornell Law
101

2019]

123

study reports that “only slightly more than one third (37 percent) of workplaceonly investors have some basic financial knowledge as measured by the Big
Three, and only 35 percent can answer the question about compound interest
correctly.”104
Concededly setting priorities with respect to stewardship and ESG
involves different skill sets than financial literacy. Even if investors do not
understand compound interest, they can identify and express their preferences
with respect to policy issues like corporate political spending, executive
compensation and climate change. The problem is that, even if investors’
general policy positions is clear, understanding the business ramifications of
those positions with respect to a particular portfolio company is quite
complex.105
Moreover, extrapolating from investors’ general policy positions into a
workable set of voting guidelines is more difficult than it initially appears.
Media reports highlight this challenge when they criticize mutual funds for their
voting records.106 For example, corporations face an increasing number and
range of ESG-related shareholder proposals, particularly proposals seeking
reporting or the adoption of formal board policies with respect to various social
policy concerns, 107 but there are reasons why a shareholder who supports
diversity may not support a particular diversity proposal.108 Similarly a
shareholder who opposes food waste or is concerned about climate change might
nonetheless decide that requiring an issuer report publicly on such issues is not
cost-justified. If it is difficult even to figure out what a rational shareholder
Review (reporting that levels of financial literacy among workplace-only investors
were “strikingly low.”).
104
Id.
105
A recent Wall Street Journal article highlights the impact of the “stakeholder
model” on PG&E. Allysia Finley, ‘”Stakeholder” Capitalism in Action’ (21 Oct.
2019) Wall St. J. https://www.wsj.com/articles/stakeholder-capitalism-in-action11571696787
106
See, e.g., Braham, supra note __.
107
Shareholders at Amazon’s 2019 annual meeting, for example, introduced
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would prefer, it is hard to see how the average mutual fund investor could
develop meaningful policy positions, especially when the impact of his or her
preferences on the policies of the underlying portfolio companies is likely to be
quite small.
A more practical concern with pass-through voting is voter turnout. 109
Ordinary retail investors typically vote less than 30% of their shares in corporate
elections. Voting participation by retail stockholders in mutual funds is even
lower, and mutual funds have consistently experienced difficulty in obtaining a
quorum in their shareholder meetings, even though a quorum may require as few
as one third of the outstanding shares of the fund.110 Low voter turnout is more
common among shareholders in passive funds, who tend to “set it and forget
it.”111 Moreover, because any given mutual fund generally holds hundreds of
portfolio companies or more, the number of occasions on which mutual fund
shareholders will be called upon to vote is substantially greater than for ordinary
retail investors.
Of course, limited participation need not prevent a mutual fund from
following the preferences of those beneficiaries who participate actively.
Because participation is likely to be higher by wealthier investors, however, this
109
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approach cuts against the democratic claims of some pass-through voting
advocates. There are also reasons to question whether the preferences of
wealthy retail shareholders with respect to particular policy issues or more
generally regarding the trade-off between corporate profit and non-economic
values mirror those of less sophisticated workplace-only investors.
Perhaps the most problematic concern about pass-through voting,
however, is that, to the extent a mutual fund adviser votes in accordance with
the preferences of its beneficiaries, it loses its power to negotiate with issuers
for change.112 A key rationale for increased investor stewardship is the prospect
that, because of their size and voting power, institutional investors have the
ability to influence the behavior of their portfolio companies. Indeed, this
influence can be observed not merely through voting outcomes but by noting the
number of shareholder resolutions that result in negotiated withdrawals
following management’s acquiescence or commitment to voluntary action.113
An institutional investor that relinquishes control over its voting decisions
sacrifices a powerful component of its ability to engage successfully.
CONCLUSION
Investor stewardship is a potentially powerful tool for influencing
corporate behavior. As a result, it should be handled with care. Because index
funds own an increasing percentage of global equity, they face growing scrutiny
about their stewardship role, and a number of commentators have demanded that
they do more to influence the decisions made at their portfolio companies. This
chapter argues for caution in making such demands. Index funds offer their
investors broad diversification at low cost, a model that is in tension with
demands for high quality firm-specific engagement. Further, to the extent that
stewardship encompasses pursuit of broad societal goals or balancing economic
and non-economic objectives, index funds lack the tools to do so in a way that
is faithful to the interests of their beneficiaries. Although these concerns could
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be addressed by giving index fund shareholders greater voice, it is not clear that
such reforms would be efficient or cost-effective.

